An Exploration of the 4-3-3’s Flexibility, Part Two

Part Two: The adaptability of the 4-3-3

In part one the rise in popularity of the 4-3-3 along with domination of world soccer by Barcelona and the Spanish national team was looked at. The misinterpretation of possession and it’s favored formation as the be all and end all of soccer development by many pundits and coaches was also looked at and compared to other misunderstood tactical trends of the past.

In part two, we will pick up where part one left off and explore the adaptability of the 4-3-3 and debate how useful the formation can be as new tactical obsessions have emerged to blunt possession orientated teams.

The first point to make about the 4-3-3 is that in build-up and attack play, it is rarely actually a 4-3-3. This applies to it’s defensive shape as well as many coaches who use or say they use a 4-3-3 defend in a 4-1-4-1 or a 4-2-3-1 and transition to something that is still not quite a 4-3-3 in attack. Essentially, the team lines up to start each half in a 4-3-3 and never really gets into that shape again.

The most common alignment in initial possession when playing out of the back in a 4-3-3 is a 2-3-2-3. The fullbacks join the holding midfielder’s line, the front three stretch the opponent’s back line, the two center mids(usually referred to as “attacking” mids, even though they do far more than just attack) look for space centrally and the centerbacks split wide of the penalty area.

That’s not a 4-3-3 if you look at the positions on the field without any knowledge of the names of the positions, anyone would identify the shape as a 2-3-2-3. Of course, there would be issues with a coach identifying a formation as only having two dedicated defenders, publicly. A high level coach could face scrutiny from pundits and a youth coach would potentially be inviting mass hysteria from the player’s parents if they ran home and said they only play with two defenders! It’s much ‘safer’ to publicly identify your formation as one with a back four, even if you almost never have four players in your back line.

Louis van Gaal would stand as one of the ultimate examples of not caring what anyone outside of his team thought about his formation, system, training methods and so on. And he rightly identified the formation he utilized at Barcelona(internally) as a 2-3-2-3. He did this as far back as 1997, as can be seen in the image below. It’s part of an impressive and useful Powerpoint presentation he and his staff used with Barcelona.

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This highlights what is well known and well understood in the modern game, the simple fact that fullbacks are in many systems now really wide midfielders more than they are backs. They spend the vast majority of their time either in attack or defense in positions in advance of the centerbacks. Fullbacks do still end up in the back line during defensive action in their defensive third but in a high possession, attack minded team that presses out of possession is it really correct to identify these players as fullbacks?

The Barcelona fullback pairing of Jordi Alba and Dani Alves took perhaps the most liberal of definitions in being called fullbacks in their time together. Currently, Danny Rose and Kyle Walker for Tottenham similarly should be looked at as wide midfielders and not fullbacks. Alba and Rose can often be found as the most advanced player in their opponent’s half at the end of an attacking sequence. Alves and Walker’s positioning on the right becomes extremely high when the winger/mid in front of them drifts inside as Lionel Messi did with Alves. All four are also routinely involved in pressing actions well in advance of their centerback pairing as well.

Are coaches then held back in getting what they want out of their players because of position names and traditional formation designations? US Soccer advocates using numbers in place of position names. Is this any better? No. It’s arguably worse to call a fullback a “2”, as this number in of itself provides no information.

The numbering system also seeks to create confusion as the position/number link changes with each formation and it is naive to assume every team in the country should be playing the same formation all of the time. And every coach’s definition of what he expects from his “7” would differ from one coach to the next anyways. So why the need to advocate for this antiquated way of identifying positions? The US Soccer numbering system is based off the English numbering system from the 2-3-5 formation used through the 1920s. How is that in anyway applicable and helpful to coaches and players in the modern game?

What if coaches freed themselves from the limitations of position names and numbers and freed themselves from traditional formation designations as well? If you play a 2-3-2-3, then call it that. If you don’t really have fullbacks, then don’t call your players fullbacks. The game of soccer is fluid and positions and formations need to be fluid as well and most importantly players need to understand that.

Players need structure of some sort, yes, especially at youth levels, you would not get too far with sending eleven players onto the field with the message of “figure it out”. Providing players with a template to position themselves and then training them in how to adapt to what the opponent’s present to defend them would enable a team to seamlessly play in multiple formations within the same game. And less emphasis on positions and formations, which actually dictate very little, would allow this exploration to come about.

We see Pep doing this every week for Manchester City. Only Pep is orchestrating these movements, he doesn’t have time for the players to figure it out on their own because his directive is to win games and trophies. Youth coaches should not be orchestrating all of their player’s movements in games. They should be allowed to explore solutions to tactical problems largely on their own. Especially in attack. Taking time in training to show these situations and orchestrate the movements to cope with them would be the correct approach.

The players can then be given the game, because the game is for the players, to see if they can apply what was taught in training to a game situation. The youth coach would be able to take pride in seeing his centerbacks and holding mid switch to a back three to deal with a center forward pairing pressing them high up the field on their own. Or a wide player recognizing their teammates are 3v3 in the center and moving in to the half space to try and provide support.

As a template for this learning process, the 4-3-3 provides a plethora of tactical movements to twist  and mold it’s shape to deal with the opponent’s defensive shape and tactics. Below we will look at several different examples that provide tactical solutions and can be utilized from the platform provided in the 4-3-3.

Tactical Solutions for being 3v3 in Central Midfield

When the 4-4-2 was a more common formation, the 4-3-3’s three central midfielders offered an advantage for controlling possession centrally. It is much more common now to see three central midfielders than it is two and in order to maintain numerical superiority, a fourth central midfielder is needed.

In a 4-3-3 that fourth player can come from seven different outfield positions across the back and forward lines. The four wide players, however, would be better able to move into the half spaces, which we will see below. That leaves the center forward and the centerbacks as the three players ideally suited to be able to quickly move from their defensive positions into a central position.

The False Nine

Perhaps the most well known tactic for creating a 4v3 in central midfield is the use of a false nine. A false nine is a center forward who occupies the traditional center forward space when defending, in between the opponent’s centerbacks, and then drops away from them into the center of the field in possession to link play with the center mids. This forces the centerbacks to decide to either let him go unmarked or follow him. Following leaves space in the back line to be exploited by the wingers, not following allows the 4v3 to be created.

It is a simple but effective tactic that allows the creation of a diamond midfield to play around three center mids. The term false nine can and has been misused. Kyle Martino of NBC Sports features regularly on their Premier League coverage and has misused the term. Martino identifies a false nine as any player playing in the center forward position who is not normally a center forward.

This is incorrect and spreads misunderstanding to viewers of NBC Sports’ soccer coverage. By Martino’s logic, when Jake Livermore, a center midfielder, filled in for several games at the start of this season for Hull as a centerback he would have been a ‘false centerback’, which of course, he was not. He was simply being played out of his natural position. Cesc Fabregas featured as a false nine for Spain at Euro 2012 and is normally a central midfielder but he did play a false nine role. When Andre Schurrle played as a center forward for Chelsea a few years back he played a traditional center forward role and thus was not a false nine, even though he is normally played in wide positions.

Below is a short video highlighting the most basic idea and movements from the false nine role.

One could also solve this problem by permanently playing with an attacking midfielder as a constant fourth midfielder and asking the wingers to vary their movements infield more than usual and effectively switch from a 4-3-3 to a 4-4-2 diamond. This though would sacrifice defensive coverage in the wide areas and negate a front three’s ability to stretch a back line(this is highlighted by Johan Cruyff in a video below). It wouldn’t be an unreasonable tactic for seeing out a close game, however, as this subtle change would allow for better defensive coverage centrally if a team was comfortable giving up some space out wide and decided to sit deep and see a game out.

Using a Centerback as the holding midfielder

Similar to using a center forward to drop directly into the central area of the field in build-up and attack play and play as an attacking midfielder, a centerback can be used as a fourth midfielder as well. This tactic would be of good use against a 4-2-3-1 as the opponent’s attacking mid would be forced to deal with two holding midfielders and not simply able to press or mark the lone holding mid in a 4-3-3.

Rotational movement of a three player midfield may also solve this situation as this movement could allow players to get free in a 3v3 situation. However, there are multiple reasons why this tactic would not be preferable. Johan Cruyff believed that two holding mids and one attacking mid was too defensive and did not allow for opportunities to advance the ball centrally with just one advanced midfielder looking for space between the defensive and midfield lines.

Rotational movement could also create that issue if the opponents allowed a center mid dropping deep to go unmarked, effectively making a 1-2 midfield into a 2-1. Introducing a centerback as an additional holding midfielder would allow for both a double pivot and two players in advanced midfield positions looking for space between the lines.

Secondly, rotational movement of a midfield three sacrifices having a dedicated holding midfielder, something some coaches, like Peter Motzenbecker of Abbey Villa S.C., are unwilling to give up. Peter explains why below:

I find incredibly important to have a fixed holding midfielder, rather than rotation from that spot. If you want your two further midfielders to rotate to get on the ball deep, that’s fine, but especially in the youth game, there are too many transitions to not have someone fixed.

The defensive importance of the holding midfielder is something that should not be overlooked in build-up and attacking movements. In a high possession team with aggressive positioning the holding midfielder is arguably the most important position to allow the team to play in this way. Barcelona’s incredible attack play would not be possible without the attacking talents that featured for them over their period of dominance but it also would not be possible without Sergio Busquets’ ever present outstanding understanding of the fixed pivot position.

Both the false nine and centerback moving into central midfield are examples of offering direct support to a midfield three without drastically disrupting those three players positioning and roles in the team.

A great current example of using a centerback in midfield is provided to us from the Australian A-League. Tim Palmer has done a great breakdown of Melbourne City’s formation in build-up. City doesn’t utilize a 4-3-3 but it does give a good visual as to the different positioning when they are defending to when they are attacking. The interesting twist on what City has done is that they use a right centerback in midfield and their right back tucks in to take his place.

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Credit for this image goes to Tim Palmer and can be found in his excellent analysis here: Tim Palmer Football

The left back still moves out wide leaving them with an asymmetrical formation. It’s an interesting idea similar to the futsal tactic of placing the fixed defender on either side of the court to join that sided winger while leaving the opposite side of the court with only one player. Varying this tactic and creating an asymmetry on different sides of the field could be useful in making playing out of the back less predictable and less easier to deal with as most teams set out to defend in symmetrical formations.

Utilizing the half spaces

Additionally, recognizing that the field is wide enough to break it into five vertical zones introduces the “half spaces” to tactical discussion and solutions. Using the space that is not quite in the center but not quite in the wide areas and making players aware of this space offers a wide range of benefits. The use of the half spaces is a complicated tactic on to it’s self, here we will just discuss how positioning players there in build-up can help to alleviate the 3v3 situation centrally.

If centerbacks and center forwards are best able to directly help out centrally, wingers and fullbacks are also able to assist centrally by occupying the half spaces. Again, discussion of the half spaces has become a popular topic and it’s usefulness currently in attack play is due to the fact that most defensive formations don’t have players positioned to defend these areas. Opposition wide midfielders and fullbacks are meant to deal with the fullbacks and wingers of the 4-3-3.

However, the problem for these defensive players is what to do when the player they expect to be in the wide areas moves infield. It’s the same issue for centerbacks caused by the false nine’s movement. If a winger moves into the half space and the opponent’s fullback doesn’t follow, he’s free of being marked and can support the 3v3 situation in central midfield. If the opponent’s fullback follows, that space out wide can be exploited by a fullback advancing down the touchline.

For a fullback moving into the half space, the opponent’s wide mid can follow and deny him supporting the central midfielders or not follow and allow him to assist ball circulation centrally. If the opposition wide mid does follow the fullback into the half space, the winger on that side would be able to drop deeper in the wide areas into this vacated space and get on the ball, once again tempting the opponent’s fullback to follow or not follow.

Adrian Dubious is the head coach of Saint Joseph’s College of Maine Men’s soccer team, who’s team utilized a ‘false’ fullback on a regular basis on their way to regular and postseason conference championships and the program’s first win in the NCAA Division Three tournament as well. The Monks had an exceptional defensive record and part of that was because of the defensive stability offered by having a fullback move centrally and form a double pivot with the holding midfielder while maintaining a back three.

The Monks played against teams that, for the most part, were most effective only in quick, counter attacking, overly direct movements immediately upon regaining possession. Dubois found that the two holding midfielders and back three guarded against these quick counter attacks well. Saint Joseph’s would defend in non-counter attacking situations in a 4-1-4-1, making this tactic applicable to a 4-3-3 defensive formation.

This 3-2 block allowed for secure ball circulation in deep positions while the front five were given a good deal of freedom to move in advance of the ball and look for spaces to receive passes in. The wingers, in what was nominally a 3-2-4-1, gained much from this setup as they were afforded many chances to take players on in 1v1 situations. And when you have players well able to be successful in attacking 1v1 situations, you want to be sure they are given the chance to do so as often as possible.

The use of fullbacks in central positions has become popular recently and Pep’s use of them early on with Manchester City drew lots of attention. It is important to remember, and Pep says this all of the time, all of his ideas have been taken from someone else. Pep was a master pupil of Johan Cruyff and he utilized a fullback in central midfield as well when he coached Ajax and Barcelona. He  describes this in the below video, which if you have not seen, is an incredible insight to the mind of Cruyff. Most telling is his statement that he was actually much more defensive than people thought.

The half spaces can also be utilized by wingers further up the field in attacking movements inside the opponent’s half. As mentioned above, this movement leaves the opponent’s fullback with the decision to follow the winger or not. This movement can be effective for different types of wide players. Goal scoring wide players playing as inverted wingers, right footers on the left wing and vice versa, may find more opportunities for shots on goal with late movement looking to receive passes off the center forward. Strong dribblers can unsettle defenses by dribbling into the half space as it is confusing as to who should close him down and if he’s closed down by an opposition midfielder, it would free up a center mid for the attacking team.

Playmakers like Juan Mata of Manchester United can also find space for their incisive passes from the half space and may find it easier to lose their marker than they would operating in the traditional center attacking midfield position. This advanced half space in front of the opponent’s back line would have been previously occupied in the 2-3-5 and the W-M that followed it by inside forwards. However, inside forwards would have been operating in these spaces during all phases of play. Permanently playing with inside forwards in the modern game can be effective but moving players in and out of these spaces in attack would possibly do a better job of unsettling defenses.

These above tactics can be utilized to solve a range of tactical problems, not just dealing with facing a three player midfield by an opponent.The use of a centerback or fullback in midfield, for example, allows a team the option of using a back three in build-up to deal with facing two center forwards and create a more comfortable 3v2 situation. The holding midfielder dropping in between the centerbacks to create a back three is another popular option for a 4-3-3 being pressed by two centerbacks.

From switching to a back three with the holding mid a team would switch to a 3-4-3 and sacrifice it’s three player midfield. However, many of the above tactical options could be used in this situation as well to further change the shape. Deploying both fullbacks centrally as the holding mid drops would create a 3-2-2-3(a modern W-M), bringing one or both wingers into the half spaces and leaving the fullbacks in the wide areas would shift the shape into a 3-4-2-1. These are only a few examples and shows the near endless flexibility of the 4-3-3 as a starting point for a very diverse tactical approach.

Utilizing these tactical solutions from the platform of a 4-3-3 allows for a good deal of improvisation from a team or even a couple individuals within the team. Interchanging positioning in attack but reverting to a set formation while defending can give a team unpredictability in one phase of play and stability in another.

That’s what makes the 4-3-3 a useful platform, it can vary itself in it’s attacking shape when needed and is an effective formation for a pressing orientated team as well. Teams can also alternate between pressing in a 4-3-3 shape and dropping off into a more conservative 4-1-4-1 due to either their opponent’s style and level or as dictated by player fitness levels or the game situation.

Whether the ultimate goal for a team is at a high level to win games and trophies or for a youth team to develop it’s players into complete players, both of these situations would benefit from an unpredictable attack and a solid defense. Coupling a move away from traditional ways of identifying positions and formations and freeing players from restraints would benefit any team at any level. Introducing these concepts to a team would also lead to further discoveries in tactical ideas from players, not every tactical tweak in a team needs to come from the coach.

There is concern in the US and Europe that the creative player is becoming harder and harder to find. The loss of street football in Europe and it’s practical non existence at any point in the US is cited for this occurrence. That environment can’t be replicated but if we both teach players tactical solutions and encourage them to explore them and give them the freedom to solve problems on their own, we can let creative players emerge and flourish. Harsh tactical guidelines and playing styles crushes individuals creative spirit.

The formation, any formation, needs to be understood as the starting points for a team, because you do have to start somewhere,  but no team should be defined or limited by it’s formation. The 4-3-3 is a great starting point because of the range of attacking shapes it can take and it offers good defensive cover as well, especially for teams looking to press high up the field. It’s an excellent template for talented players to grow and express themselves in.

The ultimate challenge for a team and it’s coach would be to develop a truly fluid, ever changing and cohesive style that would defy any numerical label as to it’s formation. It may have rose in popularity for misunderstood reasons during Barcelona and Spain’s dominance but it shouldn’t fade away now that the newest trends in coaching circles have moved away from keeping possession. The 4-3-3 is an excellent starting point to begin an evolutionary journey for a team looking to fully explore it’s attacking capabilities and creativity.

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An Exploration of the 4-3-3’s Flexibility

Part One: The Rise of the 4-3-3 alongside our obsession with possession

Ever since Barcelona and the Spanish national team’s domination of top level soccer from 2008-2012, the 4-3-3 formation has become synonymous with possession orientated soccer, especially at youth level in the United States. Playing a high possession style doesn’t just come from selecting a particular formation and the 4-3-3 isn’t the only formation a possession orientated team can utilize either. Why then is it used to suit teams who seek to play in this way?

Surely, utilizing a 4-3-3 as a team’s base formation goes beyond the fact that if Barcelona and Spain used it, then it must be the way forward. Before going into it’s flexibility and debating just how useful a formation it is for a team looking to dominate possession, let’s first look at what the formation offers in it’s most basic form.

What does the 4-3-3 offer?

Three players in central midfield

This is often cited as a major benefit of the formation as it allows better ball circulation centrally against a two player midfield. When defending it also allows for one player to screen the back four and still leave two center mids in more advanced areas to press or mark opponents.

Four players in the wide areas

With fullbacks and wingers on both sides of the field this allows for a team to open up in possession and attempt to stretch their opponent’s defensive shape. Unlike a 4-4-2 or 4-2-3-1, which also utilize four players in wide areas,  the high initial positioning of the wingers occupies the opposition fullbacks and limits their ability to disrupt build-up play. The fullbacks can then also operate in more room in the wide areas and seek to provide support both to central midfielders and centerbacks.

Centerback Partnership

The ideal setup for dealing with a lone center forward. It also allows centerbacks to form a diamond shape with their goalkeeper and holding midfielder in possession, which can be used to the advantage of teams with a goalkeeper comfortable on the ball.

Lone Center Forward

The one area of the field in which the 4-3-3 is usually at a numerical disadvantage. The lone center forward is either left to deal with two centerbacks who can mark and cover him or three centerbacks who can pass him off to one another as he moves around the back, if their opponent uses wingbacks to deal with the wingers.

 

The above describes what seems like a very useful template for a team looking to dominate possession and territory. The wide players can stretch the opponent’s defensive shape, the three player midfield can combine with one another and the wide players to advance the ball and break defensive lines in key central areas.

If a constant holding midfielder is used, he can provide defensive cover while in attack and facilitate changing the point of attack from a largely fixed position.

However, how easily can these advantages be countered and turn the team using a 4-3-3 into one that may be able to keep possession but not pose a goal scoring threat?

The 4-2-3-1 offers the near perfect counter system to the 4-3-3. It deploys two holding mids to limit the space in front of the back four and coupled with an attacking mid, matches the 4-3-3’s three player midfield. The wide midfielders can sit a bit deeper and narrow and allow the 4-3-3’s fullbacks possession, yes, but not in threatening areas.

As a unit a team in a 4-2-3-1 can allow initial possession and press aggressively when the ball is played into the wide areas. This can be most easily done when a fullback is in possession. A team in a 4-3-3 with limited access to it’s midfield players, inability to use the wide areas and an isolated center forward can easily be blunted into playing around the back line in the dreaded “U shape” Pep Guardiola derided in Pep Confidential. 

An extremely narrow 4-4-2 defensive shape can also blunt the 4-3-3’s ability to be used as an effective tool for controlled build-up play as the center forward pairing can press the 4-3-3’s centerbacks, the fullback nearest to the ball can be pressed by a wide midfielder and the opposite side wide mid can tuck in and create a 3v3 centrally against the 4-3-3’s three midfielders. This can force a team in a 4-3-3 back to the keeper quickly and into a long  clearance.

The 4-3-3’s ability to stretch the opponent’s defensive shape only works if the opponent wants to deny possession in the wide areas. A common tactic is to defend in a narrow block and squeeze out the space centrally while allowing for space out wide in less threatening areas. Being compact while defending can refer to both vertical and horizontal compaction. A defensive block that doesn’t get stretched in either direction and can maintain it’s discipline can completely blunt a possession orientated attack.

These different shapes and pressing tactics have been well, well, spoken about, documented, written about and analyzed over the last couple of years. Pressing became the next big thing in coaching circles, then pressing triggers, counterpressing(gegenpressing) and so on and you could argue possession turned into a dirty word.

That’s a whole other discussion in of itself. As Pep has said, possession was never the purpose of his Barcelona. That was what was most easily seen, however, and thus became the easiest part of what Barcelona did for coaches to replicate with their teams. Possession for possessions sake, the over use of the phrase tiki taka, became prevalent in youth soccer circles.

Just as now we hear coach’s screaming “press press!!” or counting off the five seconds in which the team has to win the ball back every time possession is lost. These coaches mostly though have not provided their players with how to press or when or what to do when those five seconds are up. They blend pressing and running into the same thing. Pundits jump up and down about which Premier League team ran the most at the weekend, distance covered has become the replacement for yesterday’s dominant statistic, possession percentage.

The true identity of what is happening on the field is never fully understood. Pep demanded far more than just possession and Mauricio Pochettino does far more than just simply tell his players to run around like maniacs until possession is regained.

As Jonathan Wilson has stated, this is the history of the game’s tactical developments. Hurbert Chapman’s W-M was misinterpreted as being a defensive, more negative system than the 2-3-5 it replaced. Helenio Herrera’s infamous catenaccio wasn’t as defensive as it became known to be. Herrera himself sums up this phenomenon of misinterpretation quite well:

The problem is that most of the ones who copied me copied me wrongly. They forgot to include the attacking principles that my Catenaccio included. I had Picchi as a sweeper, yes, but I also had Facchetti, the first full-back to score as many goals as a forward

Replace “catenaccio” in that quote with “system” and it’s a quote that Pep, Pochettino, Jurgen Klopp and many others would readily stand behind. “They forgot to include the attacking principles” can be said for those who played tiki taka and thought they were playing like Barcelona or those who think they’re playing like the current Liverpool and Tottenham sides by screaming “press!!” upon loss of possession.

What does all that have to do with the 4-3-3 formation? In the way the style of play was misinterpreted, so is it’s favored formation. In that keeping possession was never really just about keeping possession, the 4-3-3 is never really a 4-3-3. It’s true capabilities lie in it’s ability to change and adapt.

In Part two we’ll look into the 4-3-3’s ability to change it’s shape with specific examples of tactical options from Europe, Australia and even the state of Maine in the US…

 

Spurs Stall Out Away to Hull, 1-1

After Tottenham’s midweek disaster at home to Manchester City, Spurs were hoping for a quick three points and a rebound away to Hull City(Tigers). Any one of the bottom ten teams would have done following Man City, with everything so tight in tenth through twentieth position there’s plenty of reason for optimism when facing any of them. But Hull were tough for Spurs to breakdown at the Lane earlier in the year only able to come away with a 1-0 victory thanks to a Roberto Soldado penalty. There would be nothing to save Spurs this time around, however, and Tottenham had their worst performance in the Sherwood era.

The match saw a return to Tactical Timmy’s much maligned 4-4-2 formation, which initially looked like a major tactical blunder as Hull have fielded a 3-5-2 formation at times this season. A back three came into popularity as the preferred counter to two striker systems and subsequently went away with the trend towards 4-2-3-1 and other single striker systems that made three centerbacks redundant. Luckily, Sherwood was spared being outclassed from the get go by Steve Bruce, as Bruce also opted to go 4-4-2. Hull paired their new strike force of Nikica Jelavic and Shane Long up top, with the two operating together with good effect.

Despite the similar formations, the approach in possession of the two teams could not have been much more different. Spurs dominated possession with a 77% percent pass completion rate and 61% of the ball and looked for chances on goal with both slick passing counter attacks and sustained build up play. Tottenham’s two forwards, Soldado and Adebayor, worked the channels or dropped off into midfield to assist the build up play on a regular basis. Hull’s front pairing stayed higher up the pitch looking to get onto the end of long balls and attack Spurs directly. Jelavic made himself useful with his physicality and Long used his excellent pace to good effect.

The main tactical feature of the game was space in between the defensive and midfield lines, for both teams , when defending. It is no surprise to see this from Spurs in a 4-4-2 as their lack of a holding midfield player in four or five man midfields has been well, well, documented. But Hull allowed too much space in between their two banks of four as well and it’s a bit of surprise neither side took advantage of this more, as the two goals came from a sequence starting with a goal kick and a free kick.

The opening goal came in the opening fifteen minutes of the match as both sides created excellent chances one after another in short order that perfectly exploited the other sides weakness. Unfortunately for Spurs, Adebayor’s volley was saved but Long was able to chip Lloris and put Hull ahead. The snapshot below shows, perhaps, Spurs best chance from open play, a series of short combination passing followed with a short cross from Soldado and an outstanding volley from Adebayor.

GoodStuffSpurs

Shortly after, Hull exposed Spurs’ lack of a holding midfield player and got their goal by pulling Vertonghen and Dawson, Spurs centerback pairing, apart vertically from one another as Vertonghen went forward to challenge Long in the air from a Hull goal kick and Dawson marked Jelavic. Neither Vertonghen or Long won the ball in the air but it fell behind them, came to Jelavic who flicked it into the path of Long who easily raced by Dawson and away from Vertonghen to score with a nice finish 1v1 with Lloris.

SplitCenterbacks

Hull were content to keep playing the long game with both Jelavic and Long looking effective. And their long passing game was quite succesful, they completed 24 of 53 long passes(45%) while defensively, Long and Jelavic took away Spurs short passing options and were able to force them long. But Spurs only completed 12 of 39 long passes, 30%, and were poor taking free kicks inside their own half, completing just 3 of 10.

Shane Long was an outstanding nuisance in this match, he committed five fouls in and around Spurs area, created two chances, scored a goal, received fifteen passes from Hull’s half into Spurs half, recovered possession twice, won five of his twelve aerial duels(four in Spurs half) and was fouled three times himself. He showed exactly why Hull brought him in, pace, good finishing and an ability to be generally very energetic and annoying to his opponents for 90 minutes.

HullLong

Hull setup their front pairing in their initial defensive block in between Spurs centerbacks and central midfield pairing of Bentaleb and Dembele while their midfield four took up positions around the halfway line. This was a more proactive defensive block than that set out by Tony Pulis when Palace played Spurs, Pulis allowed Spurs central midfield pairing plenty of possession and took away their other options, here, they were pushed further back and not allowed to easily receive passes from the back. But it did create the potential weakness of, again, space between the lines for Eriksen to operate freely. Eriksen received 47 passes, including ten that crossed from Spurs half into Hull’s.

ImmaFreeBitch

Eriksen was able to complete 17 of 20 passes in the final third, 40 of 50 passes overall and had three shots from outside the area. Unfortunately, two of those shots were off target and one was blocked. He did hit Adebayor with six passes, two received inside the area, and also found Soldado with a pass eight times. But Hull did a solid defensive job inside their own area and Eriksen’s ability to roam didn’t end up hurting Hull.

Spurs also showed an ability to counter effectively, at least in terms of getting from their own half into Hull’s defensive third, with rapid sequences of passes on the ground. In the snapshot below Spurs move from their defensive third into Hull’s area with five well placed passes and win a corner.

ProperCounterAttack

Adebayor showed yet another dimension to his game against Hull, his ability to hold up back to goal against a centerback and take passes into feet and then look to layoff. Yet again, in this match Spurs were able on several occasions to hit Adebayor with a pass in or around Hull’s area from a central position because of the space in between the lines. Below, one such instance shows Adebayor receive a pass and then lay it off moments later to Eriksen(who’s not in screen) at the top of the area who then gets his blocked shot off and it goes out for a corner.

Suckinlayoff

The goal scored by Hull highlights well enough why there is a need for a more defensive minded midfield player on the pitch for Spurs, despite Les Ferdinand’s comments this week that he doesn’t like holding midfielders. He wants his midfield players to be more complete players, capable of contributing to the build up and attack play and also playing a role defensively. But that’s what all managers want, ideally, yes, you would want complete players in the central areas, but they are not so easy to find or cheap to acquire, there are only so many Sergio Busquets type players to go around.

What can be done in  to replicate this type of player? One, is to play a double pivot, two deep mids who take going forward in turns, with a strong understanding that if one goes, the other one stays. Spurs haven’t been able to find a partnership that has worked in this capacity so far, as it does for Man City and Chelsea quite well. Secondly, the creator/destroyer central pairing in a 4-4-2/4-4-1-1, which Spurs fans will remember Harry employing with Sandro and Luka Modric to great effect in the past, Sherwood hasn’t really given this a go yet either, that even Harry recognized the need for a Sandro or Scott Parker type in midfield is damning even more of Sherwood’s nativity.

Those are two options to avoid the holding midfield player being run out in a 4-1-4-1/4-3-3 that Sherwood and Ferdinand fear doing so badly. Or they could just play a holding mid and admit they do not have a Sergio Busquets type player kicking around at the Lane at the moment. So long as they continue with this preference of selection, Spurs will continue to see problems in the middle of the park. Spurs interception chart below shows a glaring lack of interceptions made in the particular area of the field where a holding mid would take up his position.

Interwhatty

The match did display the contrast in styles that two teams can have while playing the same basic formation, no 4-4-2s are the same and we saw that clearly in this match. But just because Spurs version of 4-4-2 is not “orthodox” does not mean it can and will always be effective. Sherwood moved away from it for a while and fielded a 4-1-4-1 to good effect against Swansea but it will be interesting to see if he will break away from it again. And once Sandro is fit he will have the option of pairing him with his Brazilian counterpart, Paulinho, or his buddy from last season, Dembele, in the center of the park. If he chooses not to use the creator/destroyer tandem with a fully fit Sandro, who has proven himself in the Premier League, at his disposal, serious questions will start to be asked about Sherwood.

In the meantime, Hull City can come away from this match the much happier of the two sides, as they took a valuable point from a relatively in form, big club and having done so by executing their game plan better than the boys from the Lane. Bruce’s approach created a goal and stifled Spurs creativity and open football well enough to take something from the match, he succeeded where Stoke, Palace,Swansea and even Manchester United failed, putting the breaks on Sherwood’s free flowing football and making them pay for their defensive shortcomings.

Check back later in the week for a closer look at Bentaleb’s and Soldado’s performances against Hull City